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CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION, 
AND INSOLVENCY LAW IN JAPAN 
Benjamin T. Jones† 
Abstract: This article identifies potential relationships between the 
methods by which large firms in the business sector are externally financed and 
creditors’ determinations to resolve business failure through private negotiation 
or formal insolvency proceedings.  Prior to the deregulation of Japan’s capital 
markets in the 1980s, large firms relied heavily on bank debt as a source of 
external capital.  Consequently, their capital structures and their creditor 
compositions were relatively homogenous.  Japanese banks appeared to primarily 
resolve the failure of their borrowers through private reorganizations or 
liquidations rather than court proceedings, and evidence suggests that creditor 
homogeneity was a favorable condition for the negotiated resolution of business 
failure.  Japan’s corporate insolvency laws were used relatively infrequently and 
suffered from procedural and substantive defects that likely discouraged their use.   
The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the 1980s enabled large 
firms to raise debt capital by issuing bonds, which over time resulted in the 
diversification of firm capital structures and creditor compositions.  This had 
significant consequences for the ability of creditors to negotiate the resolution of 
their borrowers’ business failure.  Japan’s long recession in the 1990s pushed 
many firms close to insolvency, yet it appears that changes in capital structure 
and creditor composition adversely affected the availability of negotiated 
resolution of business failure, and Japan’s insolvency laws remained problematic.  
This article suggests that Japanese banks developed unusual and seemingly 
irrational lending strategies for distressed borrowers, given their inability to 
resolve business failure through private negotiations or formal insolvency 
proceedings.  At the turn of the century, the Japanese legal community 
spearheaded significant reforms of Japan’s insolvency laws, and a prolonged 
surge in filing rates indicates that creditors quickly seized upon legal reforms to 
force reorganization of distressed borrowers.  While this article’s findings are 
preliminary, it represents an agenda for further research on this topic.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
The American appellate judge and legal scholar Frank Easterbrook 
observed that “[w]hen we see creditors resort to bankruptcy, they are telling 
us that the legal process is superior to market methods available to them.”1  
                                                      
† The author is an associate in the Jones Day Global Disputes Practice.  The contents of this Article 
reflect his own opinions, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm or its clients.  The author 
would like to thank Professors John O. Haley, Mark Ramseyer , Zenichi Shishido, and Harry N. Scheiber 
for their invaluable mentorship and guidance, as well as David Cromwell and the editorial staff of the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their tireless efforts and commitment to excellence.  Finally, the 
author would like to thank his family, without whom none of this would be possible.  This article is 
intended to serve as a research agenda for further empirical work. 
1  Frank Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 417 (1990).  
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This observation resonates in the context of Japan, where until recently 
corporate insolvencies were infrequently resolved through formal legal 
proceedings and creditors seemingly preferred to rely on market methods, 
such as negotiated resolution of business failure.  Recent trends in corporate 
bankruptcy filings following major legal reforms suggest that the legal 
process has become relatively more valuable to creditors in resolving 
Japanese business failure.2  This article highlights a major factor behind the 
recent gravitation of Japanese creditors to the use of the legal process in the 
resolution of business failure: limitations on the effectiveness of private 
restructuring imposed by increasingly complex creditor compositions. 
Trends in the resolution of business failure from the high-growth 
period to the past decade suggest that market methods, such as private 
reorganizations and liquidations, were the dominant means by which 
creditors negotiated the resolution of business failure.  However, during 
Japan’s long recession in the 1990s, market methods became relatively less 
effective in resolving business failure.  Indeed, Japanese banks lent heavily 
to many distressed firms during that decade, rather than negotiate the 
restructuring or liquidation of such firms.  Creditors appeared reluctant to 
push distressed firms into formal insolvency proceedings.  Finally, major 
insolvency law reforms at the turn of the century resulted in an 
unprecedented boom in insolvency filings, as creditors pushed tens of 
thousands of distressed debtors into formal reorganization proceedings.3 
This shift, when viewed through the lens of Japanese corporate 
finance, suggests a relationship between the capital structure and creditor 
composition of large Japanese firms and the availability of market methods 
to resolve business failure.  Where large Japanese firms raised capital 
primarily by borrowing from banks and where creditor composition was 
relatively homogenous, creditors appeared to rely on market methods more 
frequently than on legal process.  The deregulation of Japan’s capital 
markets in the late 1970s and 1980s enabled large firms to issue bonds in 
domestic and overseas capital markets, and resulted in the diversification of 
firm capital structures and creditor compositions.  Throughout Japan’s 
prolonged recession in the 1990s, market methods fell short of enabling 
creditors to privately resolve business failure, and existing substantive and 
procedural defects in Japan’s insolvency laws continued to discourage the 
use of legal process.  Therefore, insolvency law reforms may have enabled 
                                                      
2  Kent Anderson, Japanese Insolvency Law After a Decade of Reform, 42 CAN. BUS. L.J. 2, 7 
(2006).  
3  Id. at 16.   
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diverse classes of creditors to resolve business failure through the legal 
process. 
This analysis is structured chronologically, and attempts to relate 
developments in Japan’s capital markets and the methods by which market 
participants resolved business failure.  Accordingly, this article is organized 
into eight parts, as described below. 
Part II reviews the factors that led large Japanese firms to rely 
primarily on bank debt as an external source of capital during Japan’s 
economic modernization in the period ranging roughly from the 1950s to the 
1970s.  Part III discusses the private restructuring of Toyo Kogyo, 
identifying potential lessons regarding the significance of capital structure 
and creditor composition to the ability to resolve business failure through 
market methods.  Part IV surveys prior scholarship on Japan’s insolvency 
laws, private reorganizations, and liquidations, and explains why market 
methods were seemingly preferable to legal process where capital structures 
and creditor compositions were relatively homogenous.  Part V describes the 
deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the 1980s, and suggests that this 
deregulation changed the capital structures and creditor compositions of 
large firms, with consequences for Japanese banks and implications for the 
resolution of business failure through use of market methods.   
Part VI identifies possible barriers to the use of market methods and 
legal processes to resolve business failure during Japan’s prolonged 
recession in the 1990s, and suggests that banks consequently developed 
seemingly irrational lending strategies for distressed firms to forestall 
insolvency.  Part VII describes the insolvency law reforms that took effect in 
2000, which resolved substantive and procedural deficiencies and enabled 
creditors to rely on legal process to restructure tens of thousands of 
distressed firms in the early 2000s.  While further empirical work is 
necessary, Part VIII offers a tentative conclusion, suggesting possible 
relationships between capital structure, creditor composition, and the choice 
between market methods and legal process to resolve business failure.   
 
II. THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF LARGE JAPANESE FIRMS: 1950S -1970S 
During Japan’s high-growth, post-war economy, falling roughly 
between the 1950s and the 1970s, bank debt was the dominant source of 
external finance for large Japanese firms.4  As discussed below, this reliance 
                                                      
4  Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other Japanese 
Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425, 430-31 (2002); see also Sadahiko Suzuki & Richard 
W. Wright, Financial Structure and Bankruptcy Risk in Japanese Companies, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 97 
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upon bank debt arose from a confluence of factors, including: the main bank 
system, the role of Japanese bureaucracy in allocating scarce capital towards 
the development of export industries, and commercial laws that made it 
expensive and difficult for Japanese firms to raise funds through the capital 
markets by privileging banks as providers of debt capital.   
 
A. Main Bank System 
Scholars of Japanese business have identified a post-war model of 
corporate finance characterized as the “main bank” system, in which large 
firms borrowed from a syndicate of lenders headed by a main bank, which 
was the bank with the largest share of loans to the firm.5  Under the main 
bank system, Japanese firms often developed a long-term borrowing 
relationship with a dominant lender, frequently but by no means exclusively 
situated within the same industrial group.6  While a large Japanese firm 
would borrow from a syndicate of lenders, the main bank would often 
provide a substantially larger proportion of loan capital than other lenders.7  
Moreover, these loans were accompanied by long-term, cross-shareholdings 
between bank and borrower, which reaffirmed the stability of the lending 
relationship.8  
Main banks monitored their borrowers, sometime by appointing bank 
directors to the boards of troubled borrowers, and there is evidence that main 
banks would share information with the a distressed borrower’s other 
lenders, reducing information asymmetries between lenders and enabling a 
coordinated approach to restructuring the debt obligations of a borrower.9  
Finally, some scholars have argued that these main banks provided 
borrowers implicit rescue guarantees, charging above-market interest rates 
on loans when the borrower was in good financial health in order to 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1985) (in Japanese firms, it is common for borrowed funds to exceed owners’ equity by a factor of six); 
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, & David Scharfstein, Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the 
Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, 
CORPORATE FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 105 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990) [hereinafter Bank Monitoring 
and Investment]. 
5  Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick, & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory 
Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 6 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).   
6  Id. at 5-6.   
7  Id. at 6.   
8  Id. at 12.    
9  Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of 
Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 68, 69 (1990) [hereinafter The Role of Banks]; Aoki, Patrick 
& Sheard, supra note 5, at 24.   
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compensate the bank for its rescue costs when the firm’s financial health 
suffered.10 
Under this system, bank rescue operations were ad hoc in nature and 
varied in form, but rescue operations generally had one or more of the 
following consequences:  1) reduction of required principal and interest 
payments on outstanding loans, 2) extension of the maturity dates on loans, 
and 3) exchange of debt for an equity stake in the firm.11  Additionally, there 
is evidence that appointments of bankers to firm boards came largely in 
response to poor liquidity and cash flow problems, and that the liquidity of 
the distressed firm increased following the banker appointment.12    
 
B. Administrative Guidance and Capital Allocation Policies  
Government capital allocation policies also encouraged a bank debt-
heavy capital structure.  During the high growth period, Japanese 
bureaucrats sought to allocate scarce capital to the development of infant 
industries for global export.13  Government policies encouraged high rates of 
personal savings, enabling commercial and state-supported banks to direct 
credit to target industries.14  Additionally, stable sources of bank lending 
facilitated trade credit between suppliers and manufacturers within an 
industry, which was a vital component of the capital structure of the 
Japanese firm.15   This bureaucratic policymaking did not just encourage 
                                                      
10  Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate Control in Japan, 54 J. FIN. 319, 321 
(1999). 
11  Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 103.  Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer have challenged the 
traditional account of implicit bank rescue guarantees, arguing that banks chose whether to pursue private 
restructuring on an ad hoc basis, and that bank monitoring, which often consisted of appointing retired bank 
directors to a troubled borrower’s board of directors, did not constitute effective monitoring.  See Yoshiro 
Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies: The Problem of Bank Rescues, 6 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 301, 302 (2005).  They claim that creditors may sometimes choose to rescue a firm in 
order to maximize debt recovery, but that banks certainly were not bound by an implicit rescue guarantee.  
Id.  Ad hoc recovery-maximizing decisions by banks are consistent with the observed consequences of 
those rescue operations that did occur.   
12  Morck & Nakamura, supra note 10, at 336 (reporting that banker appointments follow decline in 
liquidity and cash flow, and that liquidity is enhanced in the years following bank intervention); Bank 
Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 107 (finding that the investment behavior of firms which 
weakened bank ties during the 1980s in favor of greater reliance on the bond markets appears more 
liquidity-constrained than firms that stayed more reliant upon banks).  
13  See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).   
14  Id. at 15; see also Yoshiro Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, Directed Credit? The Loan Market in High-
Growth Japan, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 171, 176 (2004) [hereinafter Miwa & Ramseyer, Directed 
Credit?] (providing a critical account of the scholarly literature on credit rationing). 
15  ULRIKE SCHAEDE, CHOOSE AND FOCUS: JAPANESE BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
57 (2008); Christopher W. Anderson & Anil K. Makhija, Deregulation, Disintermediation, and Agency 
Costs of Debt: Evidence from Japan, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 314 (1999)  
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targeted lending, but provided banks with greater information about the 
prospects of their borrowers, reducing the uncertainty costs associated with 
financing new industrial ventures.16  
 
C. Capital Market Regulations 
Regulatory restrictions on Japan’s capital markets restrained 
competition among providers of capital, further emphasizing the importance 
of bank debt.  While Japan had functioning equity markets from the 1950s 
onwards, numerous regulatory restrictions undermined the growth of these 
markets.17  First, Japanese shares issued at par value rather than at market 
value, limiting the capacity of Japanese firms to capture returns on equity 
issuance.18  Equity holdings in the high-growth years consisted in significant 
part of cross-shareholdings between a firm, its lenders, and trading partners, 
and cross-shareholdings were generally illiquid and oriented towards 
preservation of long-term business relationships rather than the 
maximization of investment return.19  To compensate shareholders for tying 
up their capital in illiquid shareholding arrangements, issuers customarily 
paid annual dividends at a fractional percentage of par value, regardless of 
firm performance.20  The Foreign Capital Law restricted foreign ownership 
of Japanese equity securities, limited demand and trading volumes, and 
prevented foreign institutional investors from pressuring Japanese issuers to 
increase returns on equity.21  
Japanese law prohibited the issuance of unsecured corporate debt, 
which constrained the market for corporate debt securities.22  Moreover, the 
Bond Issuance Committee (“Bond Committee”), comprised of major 
Japanese financial institutions, held a monopoly on the appointment of bond 
trustees to oversee the management of collateral against which corporate 
bonds were issued. 23   The Bond Committee performed credit ratings to 
                                                      
16  SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 56 (MITI-sponsored research consortia diffused information about 
early-stage technologies among leading firms, indirectly upholding industry hierarchies and channeling 
investment among firms towards promising technologies). 
17  Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 100.   
18  Id.   
19  Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 429; Aoki, Patrick, & Sheard, supra note 5, at 12-14. 
20  Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 100.   
21  SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 53.  Additionally, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law gave the Ministry of International Trade and Industry the authority to regulate all cross-border 
transactions.  Id. 
22  Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313.  
23  TAKEO HOSHI, ANIL KASHYAP, & DAVID SCHARFSTEIN, THE CHOICE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF POST-DEREGULATION CORPORATE FINANCING IN JAPAN 12-13 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4421, 1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT]. 
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determine which firms were permitted to issue bonds, using capital ratio 
criteria heavily weighted towards Japan’s largest industrial companies. 24  
The Bond Committee also dictated the interest rates and maturity date of 
bond issues, and trustee banks were by far the largest purchasers of bonds, 
purchasing on average 63.4% of the bonds issued during the 1960s.25  Banks 
were well positioned to limit the volume of bonds issued and to ensure that 
their lending practices were left unchallenged, and bonds were issued almost 
exclusively to the same group of firms that already had access to bank 
debt.26  
Some scholars have suggested that, in return for their privileged role 
as a source of capital, banks were implicitly obligated to rescue distressed 
borrowers rather than let them fail. 27   In their scholarship, Miwa and 
Ramseyer argue that banks determined on an ad hoc basis whether to rescue 
troubled borrowers, and were certainly not bound by an implicit rescue 
guarantee.  While banks did not always rescue troubled borrowers, banks 
sometimes rescued such borrowers, and the rescue of Toyo Kogyo (better 
known as the manufacturer of Mazda automobiles) by Sumitomo Bank in 
1974 is illustrative of the powerful role that bank finance vested in Japanese 
financial institutions.  
III. CASE STUDY: THE TOYO KOGYO BAILOUT 
Pascale and Rohlen’s account of the bank-led private reorganization of 
Toyo Kogyo, the manufacturer of Mazda automobiles, is an illustration of 
the role that Japanese banks played in resolving the financial distress of their 
largest borrowers.  This Part recounts Pascale and Rohlen’s major findings 
and discusses those findings in the light of subsequent scholarship.  
Pascale & Rohlen provide a richly detailed case study of bank 
intervention in the operations of a financially distressed firm.28  Although 
Toyo Kogyo successfully diversified from its core truck manufacturing 
operation to the production of passenger cars in the 1960s, the firm lost a 
significant domestic and international market share in the early 1970s.29  By 
1974, Toyo Kogyo was teetering on the brink of insolvency, with seventy-
three lending institutions financing the firm’s operation, led by Sumitomo 
                                                      
24  Id.; Eric Grouse, Banks, Bonds, and Risk: The Mycal Bankruptcy and its Repercussions for the 
Japanese Bond Market, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 571, 591 (2002).  
25  Grouse, supra note 24, at 591.   
26  Id.  As Grouse notes, the banks composing the Bond Committee were uninterested in allowing the 
market for corporate bonds to disrupt their lending business.  Id. at 592.   
27 Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 102.   
28  Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround, 9 J. JAP. STUD. 219 (1983).   
29  Id. at 222-23.   
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Bank and Sumitomo Trust Bank.30  Sumitomo Bank alone had an exposure 
of $234 million to Toyo Kogyo, and Hiroshima Bank, another large lender, 
was funding both Toyo Kogyo and many of its local suppliers.  The troubled 
firm was relying on bank loans to meet its debt and trade finance 
obligations.  In early 1974, Sumitomo increased its monitoring of the 
troubled borrower, placing a team of seven bank executives in Toyo Kogyo 
to supervise its operations.31   
In late 1974, Sumitomo Bank formally intervened, calling a meeting 
of the firm’s creditors and announcing its support for Toyo Kogyo, and 
designating a Sumitomo financial subsidiary to provide bridge financing for 
the firm’s short-term obligations. 32  Sumitomo also declared that its 
executives would lead an internal restructuring of Toyo Kogyo. 33   The 
bank’s display of support consolidated resolve among lenders, and no 
lenders called in loans for expedited repayment or refused to turn over 
existing debt obligations as they came due.34  Additionally, lenders carried 
promissory notes issued by Toyo Kogyo to its suppliers in 1975, enabling 
Toyo to finance its ongoing operations.35   
As Pascale and Rohlen observe, the support of Toyo Kogyo’s creditors 
to the bank-led restructuring plan meant that the costs incurred by creditor 
resistance in the 1979 Chrysler bailout were avoided, allowing management 
and lenders to focus on restructuring rather than on political or legal 
battles. 36   Additionally, the bank’s role in mobilizing creditor support 
enabled restructuring plans to move forward without reliance on government 
loan guarantees; Sumitomo’s declared willingness to backstop other 
creditor’s losses at Toyo Kogyo diminished the need for the government to 
play an active role in the bailout operations.37  
In contrast, Chrysler had around a dozen sets of institutional lenders—
including banks in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Japan, Asia, and the Middle 
East—and six issues of publicly-held, unsecured debentures totaling over 
$400 million, and Chrysler’s financial subsidiary, Chrysler Financial 
Corporation, had substantially greater debt outstanding, all of which was 
                                                      
30  Id. at 228-29.   
31  Id. at 229.   
32  Id.   
33  Id.   
34  Id.   
35  Id. at 230.   
36  Id.; see also Paul H. Wilson, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, Working Out With the Government: The 
Chrysler Loan Guarantee Program, 4 J. L. & COM. 19 (1984) (discussing Chrysler’s struggles with its 
creditors and the U.S. government as it sought to restructure its debt in 1979). 
37  Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 230 (discussing the different roles that national government 
played in the Toyo Kogyo and Chrysler bailouts).   
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unsecured.38  Chrysler’s management spent more than a year fighting the 
firm’s institutional lenders, while seeking government loan guarantee 
assistance from Congress and the Ford Administration before management 
could fully focus on restructuring the distressed firm.39  Without a single 
large creditor to coordinate the reorganization and discipline other creditors, 
Chrysler was vulnerable to sporadic creditor defections.  Canadian banks set 
off their claims against accounts of Chrysler’s Canadian subsidiary; a 
European creditor temporarily set off its claims against funds transferred to 
Chrysler through that account; creditors initiated litigation against Chrysler 
in several U.S. states; Japanese banks refused to extend additional letters of 
credit financing for Chrysler’s imports of Mitsubishi vehicles.40   
Creditor resistance may have also represented tensions between 
lenders.  As Wilson and Borowitz observe, Chrysler’s domestic lenders took 
the position that all banks should be subject to equal sacrifices, while foreign 
lenders viewed the Chrysler restructuring as primarily a U.S. problem, 
requiring only domestic lenders to make greater financial sacrifices.41  While 
Chrysler’s lenders ultimately reached agreement on the restructuring 
arrangements, the process proved challenging.42   
After shoring up the stability of Toyo Kogyo’s relationships with its 
borrowers, Sumitomo’s executive team forced out the troubled firm’s 
incumbent management and relied on local business leaders to appoint a 
successor capable of brokering a deal with the firm’s suppliers and labor 
union. 43   Union negotiations led to the rescheduling of year-end bonus 
payments and the creation of a dispatched worker program that preserved 
union jobs while imposing cuts in vehicle production by turning production 
workers into traveling salesmen.44  Negotiations with suppliers resulted in 
supplier price cuts.45  
While full recovery took several years, Sumitomo’s initial display of 
support was vital to improving Toyo Kogyo’s cash flow and stabilizing its 
existing credit lines.46  The bank’s executives had no particular expertise in 
auto manufacturing, but bank-led intervention was likely instrumental in 
preventing creditor panic and forcing suppliers and labor unions to accept 
                                                      
38   Wilson & Borowitz, supra note 36, at 24.  
39  Id. at 34.   
40   Id.  
41   Id. at 31.  
42  Id.  
43  Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 238, 345.   
44  Id. at 239.   
45  Id. at 246.   
46  Id. at 257.   
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cost reduction measures.47  Bank-led intervention may have also prevented 
unilateral action by creditors to accelerate repayment of outstanding debt or 
foreclose against collateral, and may have reduced informational 
asymmetries between creditors as the lead creditor in the restructuring 
communicated with other creditors of the firm.48  It seems plausible that 
banks also had reputational incentives to avoid unilaterally seeking 
repayment, since they often participated in lending syndicates.  A unilateral 
call for repayment to the detriment of other lenders in the syndicate could 
potentially result in retaliation by other banks with respect to other 
syndicated loans.  
As mentioned before, Miwa and Ramseyer wisely caution against 
reading too much from the Toyo Kogyo case study.  Specifically, they 
observe that the Toyo Kogyo case study does not necessarily indicate that 
banks were skillful turnaround managers.49  Rather, the Toyo Kogyo case 
study suggests that where creditors are able to negotiate a private 
restructuring, formal legal process can be avoided.  
Questions remain regarding the motivations of creditors to bear the 
costs and risks of private restructuring when formal insolvency procedures 
are available.  Is the bank-led private reorganization of Toyo Kogyo the 
exception or the rule when it comes to corporate insolvency? In other words, 
do bailouts prevail over bankruptcies, and if so, why?  Part IV proposes that 
large lenders and troubled borrowers may prefer private resolution of 
business failure to formal insolvency proceedings, and that this preference 
resulted from a combination of bank debt-heavy capital structures and 
substantive and procedural defects in Japan’s insolvency laws.    
 
IV. BAILOUTS OVER BANKRUPTCIES: CAPITAL STRUCTURE, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW, AND THE PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATE RESTRUCTURING IN JAPAN  
As previously discussed, both Toyo Kogyo and Chrysler kept out of 
bankruptcy court, but the former spent far fewer resources than the latter to 
achieve the same outcome.50 The bank debt-heavy capital structure of Toyo 
Kogyo resulted in a relatively small number of bank creditors that, alongside 
procedural and substantive defects in Japan’s insolvency laws, may have 
contributed to this story.  Judge Easterbrook tells us that creditors’ choice of 
                                                      
47  Id.   
48  Id. at 229-30.  
49  Miwa & Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies, supra note 11, at 309-10.   
50  Wilson & Borowitz, supra note 36, at 33 (noting that Chrysler’s former CEO, Lee Iacocca, once 
stated that the government loan guarantee program had cost Chrysler one dollar in lost car sales and legal 
expenses for every two dollars it borrowed with loan guarantees).  
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bankruptcy proceedings demonstrates the superiority of legal process over 
market methods; conversely, where creditors prefer private negotiation to 
bankruptcy proceedings, this suggests that market methods are superior to 
the legal process available to them.  The insolvency laws available to 
creditors likely influenced creditor preferences for market methods. 
As discussed in this section, formal insolvency proceedings were 
relatively infrequently used, and suffered from both substantive and 
procedural defects.  Bank-led private restructurings and trade creditor-led 
private liquidations were more frequently used, and both such mechanisms 
enabled creditors and borrowers to stay out of court.  
A. Japanese Bankruptcy Law 
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, creditors in the U.S. face two basic 
procedural options:  a liquidation procedure (Chapter 7) 51  and a 
reorganization procedure (Chapter 11). 52  Toyo Kogyo’s creditors, on the 
other hand, would have found themselves confronted with five types of 
corporate insolvency procedures, including two types of liquidation 
procedures 53 –Bankruptcy (Hasan) 54  and Special Liquidation (Tokubetsu 
Seisan) 55 –and three types of reorganization procedures: Corporate 
                                                      
51  11 U.S.C. § 701 (1986).  
52  11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1978).   
53  FRANK PACKER & MARK RYSER, THE GOVERNANCE OF FAILURE: AN ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY IN JAPAN (Ctr. on Japanese Econ. and Bus., Columbia Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper 
No. 62, 1992).  Packer and Ryser also identified two categories of business failure which do not fall under 
bankruptcy in the legal sense.  First, there is “Internal Arrangement” (Uchi Seiri) which contains those 
firms for which a formal creditors’ meeting was held and there was an unanimous agreement aimed at the 
continuation of the company (although this only applies to small and medium-sized firms and is distinct 
from private workouts at large Japanese firms); and “Suspension of Bank Transactions,” a liquidation-
forcing option by which firms whose promissory notes are dishonored twice at a local clearinghouse in a 
six-month period are subject to suspension of all current account transactions and loans by member banks 
for a two-year period.  Packer and Ryser find that no firm has ever survived the enactment of “Suspension 
of Bank Transactions.” Id. at 4-6.   
54  The Bankruptcy procedure was modeled on the 1923 German civil code, and was revised in 1952 
to reflect American concepts of corporation law and the provision of discharge.  Id. at 32.  Application 
could be made by either the debtor or creditors, and the court would render an adjudication only if it was 
proven that the debtor was either incapable of covering its indebtedness, or had an excess of liabilities over 
assets.  Id.  As the authors note, this was often established through submission of a dishonored promissory 
note to the court.   Id.  Advance payment of costs was required under the procedure, and the payment 
required was scaled to the debtor’s liabilities.  Id.   The court would typically issue an order for preservative 
measures immediately following the filing of the application, provisionally attaching the debtor’s inventory 
and enjoining the debtor from making payments.  Id.  Secured creditors were capable of exercising their 
security rights outside of bankruptcy.  Id.   
55  The Special Liquidation procedure was first introduced into Japan’s Commercial Code in 1938, 
and was limited to stock companies already in the process of liquidation under the bankruptcy procedure.   
Id. at 33.  The special liquidation procedure recognized a broader set of acceptable causes, including where 
“it is deemed that circumstances exist which would seriously impede the carrying out of the liquidation,” 
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Reorganization (Kaisha Kosei),56 Corporate Arrangement (Kaisha Seiri),57 
and Composition (Wagi).58   
Packer and Ryser characterize Japanese bankruptcy law as “an array 
of strong proceedings, whereby the court is given powers to step in to settle 
a wide spectrum of financial recontracting problems, in combination with an 
                                                                                                                                                              
which has been interpreted to mean cases where multiple creditors “make the successful operation of 
ordinary liquidation difficult.”  Id. at 34.  While the court may have issued preservation measures through 
the bankruptcy proceeding, Packer and Ryser suggest that the additional preservation measures available 
through special liquidation were unlikely to prevent a creditor panic, since the firm’s shareholders were 
required to accept a resolution to dissolve the company under the bankruptcy procedure prior to initiation 
of special liquidation, and notice of the resolution was given two weeks prior to the vote.  Id.    
56  The Corporate Reorganization procedure was introduced in 1952 and modeled after Chapter 10 of 
the 1938 United States Bankruptcy Act.  Corporate reorganization was available to stock companies for 
which there was “the prospect of rehabilitation,” and an application could be filed upon the danger of 
insolvency or excess liabilities, or where the debtor was unable to pay its obligations “without exceedingly 
impeding continuation of its business.”   Id. at 38.   Applications could be made by the debtor, creditors, or 
shareholders with claims or shareholdings above ten percent of the debtor’s capital.  Id.   Advance payment 
of costs was required upon application, and the costs of corporate reorganization generally exceeded those 
of other reorganization proceedings.  Id.  The time period between the initiation of the procedure and a 
court decision in favor of the commencement of reorganization generally ran between three to six months, 
and a stay could not be issued against secured creditors prior to the court’s decision.  Id.   As Packer and 
Ryser observe, the most significant distinction between Japan’s corporate reorganization procedure and the 
reorganization procedure established by Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is that under the 
Japanese procedure, the debtor was not in possession of the firm.   Id.  Rather, the court was required to 
appoint a trustee to manage the debtor’s estate, and officers, directors and owners of the debtor were 
removed.  Id.     
57  The Corporate Arrangement procedure was introduced in 1938, and was loosely based on 
procedures under U.K. and Swiss law.  The procedure was developed to encourage the use of legal 
proceedings by stock companies and to reduce the prevalence of questionable private settlements.  Id. at 36.  
The procedure could only be initiated if there was a danger of insolvency or excess liabilities.  Id.  
Application could be made by the debtor, a creditor or shareholder with a claim or shareholding above 10% 
or 3% of the debtor’s assets, respectively.  Id.  Advance payment of costs was required upon application.  
Id.  Upon application, the court was authorized to suspend any executor process that affected the debtor’s 
assets, and the court could extend the stay to secured creditors if it was “in accord with the interests of the 
creditors in general.”  Id. at 37.   
58  The Composition procedure was introduced in 1923 and had its origins in the Austrian 
Composition Code.  Id. at 34.  As Packer and Ryser note, some scholars believe that the composition 
procedure was deemed necessary due to the severe reputational harm arising from forced composition 
under bankruptcy in Japan, which was not a viable option for a debtor that sought to continue operating as a 
going concern.  Id. at 35.  Unlike the other procedures, only debtors were eligible to file a petition for 
composition, although the circumstances under which the procedure could be invoked were the same as 
bankruptcy, thus limiting the procedure’s applicability to debtors on the verge of bankruptcy.  Id.  The 
debtor was required to submit a plan for composition, and the court would then appoint a commissioner to 
investigate the debtor’s finances and evaluate the feasibility of its plan, following which the court could 
issue an order of commencement if it determined the plan feasible and in the best interest of creditors.  Id.  
While the court was authorized to order preservation measures in order to prevent creditor panic and the 
suspension of bank transactions, the composition procedure did not prohibit payments to creditors outside 
the proceedings, nor did preservative measures apply to secured creditors.  Id.  Unlike bankruptcy, the 
debtor remained in possession of the firm during composition.  Id.  A vote of creditors was required to 
accept the plan, and if the plan failed to receive acceptance by three-quarters of unsecured creditors, the 
debtor would be pushed into bankruptcy.  Id. at 36.  Following acceptance of the plan, the court provided 
no further supervision of the enforcement of the plan, and had no power under the composition procedure 
to avoid fraudulent conveyances made prior to submission of the plan.  Id.  
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array of ‘weak’ proceedings, whereby the court’s powers are far more 
limited and designed to serve more as a ‘hands-off’ approach to private 
settlement.” 59   Additionally, Japanese courts made extensive use of 
“gatekeeping mechanisms” to pre-screen bankruptcy filings and prevent the 
abuse of protections under bankruptcy law. 60   These gatekeeping 
mechanisms included:  requirements for the advance payment of costs by the 
debtor, the discretion to grant a stay against creditors, and various judicial 
interpretations of the extent of these discretionary powers. 61   Moreover, 
application to the most powerful reorganization court in Japan required the 
removal of management upon the initiation of the procedure.62  
Given the financial costs and rigorous procedural requirements 
necessary to initiate and pursue formal insolvency proceedings, it seems 
likely that Japanese bankruptcy laws discouraged many potential applicants 
from initiating formal reorganization proceedings.  While Easterbrook 
rightly looks to the incentives of creditors to pursue market mechanisms 
versus legal processes, the incentives of incumbent management in the 
distressed firm should not be overlooked.  As Packer and Ryser argue, these 
gatekeeping mechanisms also produced the risk of “near-default costs 
caused by non-optimal operating strategies taken by managers to avoid 
default.”63  The potential costs of private action were lowered, however, by 
the existence of private liquidation and reorganization procedures driven by 
bank and trade creditors.64  
 
B. Bank-Led Private Reorganizations 
As Packer and Ryser note, bankruptcy filings accounted for only a 
very small proportion of business failures in Japan, and private liquidation 
and reorganization measures constituted the dominant practices for resolving 
business failure.65  As discussed below, Suzuki and Wright’s seminal study 
of private reorganization identifies structural preferences for bank debt-
heavy capital structures that may have reduced the negotiating costs of 
private reorganization relative to formal legal proceedings.  Additionally, 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein’s findings indicate that the addition of non-
                                                      
59  Id. at 2.   
60  Id.  
61  Id.  at 3.   
62  Id.   
63  Id.   
64  Id.   
65  Id.   
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bank bondholders to the capital structure of Japanese firms may have 
increased the costs of private resolution of business failure.   
Specifically, Suzuki and Wright argue that Japanese firms’ preference 
for debt finance was matched by the willingness of Japanese lenders to 
create long-term financing arrangements for borrowers, and to continue 
lending to financially distressed borrowers.66  They identify this willingness 
to lend as arising from the Bank of Japan’s (“BOJ”) tolerance of large loan-
out ratios (loans to deposits) through “overloans,” as well as banks’ reliance 
on nondeposit sources of funds, including the BOJ’s rediscount window and 
the call money market in which other financial institutions place surplus 
funds.67  
Because of this institutional architecture designed to promote debt 
finance and bank-borrower relationships, Suzuki and Wright propose that 
large Japanese firms purchase security against financial distress by ceding 
control to their major lenders, either in the form of bank rescue or by 
engineering mergers or takeovers.68  The authors look at three measures of 
firm health–accounting measures, social importance measures, and main-
bank relationship measures–and conclude that accounting measures, such as 
worsening cash flow, falling profits, and increasing debt accurately describe 
the approach of the firm towards financial distress, but do not predict 
whether the firm will file for bankruptcy. 69   Rather, they suggest that 
measures of a company’s social importance and the strength of its main bank 
relationship may be more accurate indicators of a distressed firm’s chance of 
survival.70 
While Suzuki and Wright identify broad indicators of a distressed 
firm’s survival, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein scrutinize more closely the 
role of banks in mitigating the costs of financial distress.  They propose that 
free-rider problems reduce incentives for creditors to grant financial relief or 
extend credit where creditors are numerous, since any given creditor may 
feel less inclined to risk its own capital where it cannot predict the behavior 
of its fellow creditors, but that these disincentives become less severe where 
creditors are fewer in number.71  
Large and diffuse classes of bondholders pose special challenges in 
debt restructuring, since bondholders are unlikely to be well-informed about 
the conditions of the distressed firm and cannot easily know whether it is in 
                                                      
66  Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 99-101.   
67  Id. at 101.   
68  Id. at 102.   
69  Id. at 105.   
70  Id.   
71  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 68-69.   
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their interests to push for accelerated repayment or to accept delayed 
repayment or debt-for-equity swaps.72  Large lenders to the firm often have 
better information about the distressed firm’s prospects and can 
communicate this information to fellow lenders in private negotiations.73 
Because Japanese banks often hold significant proportions of the bonds 
issued by their borrowers, 74  it seems plausible that the informational 
asymmetries that typically arise between bank lenders and bondholders are 
mitigated by the dual role of Japanese banks as lenders and bondholders.   
This argument is consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein’s 
finding that distressed firms whose capital structure contains a higher 
proportion of debt finance from their largest lender invest more and sell 
more than other firms,75 and that the costs of financial distress are higher for 
firms with many creditors than for firms with relatively few creditors.76 
C. Trade Creditor-Led Private Liquidations 
While private reorganizations were more commonly bank-led, as in 
the case of Toyo Kogyo, the trade creditors of the distressed firm often 
initiated private liquidations.  Extensive reliance on trade credit was a 
corollary to long-term business relationships within Japanese supply chains, 
and trade creditors often had outstanding accounts receivable from the 
distressed firm.77  Business failure of a single firm could send shockwaves 
through the delicate networks of trading partners, triggering a chain of 
business failures.78  Thus, trade creditors had strong incentive to manage the 
orderly liquidation of a distressed trade debtor. 
Where bank rescue was not forthcoming–and it was not often 
forthcoming in the business failures of small and medium sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”)–trade creditors would take the situation into their own hands, 
sometimes resorting to self-help measures by seizing the distressed firm’s 
assets in midnight raids before organized liquidation proceedings are 
initiated.79  Indeed, Packer and Ryser describe a stereotypical SME business 
                                                      
72  Id. at 68.   
73  Id. at 69.   
74  Grouse, supra note 24, at 591-92.   
75  The Role of Banks, supra note 9, at 86.   
76  Id.   
77  PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20.  Anderson & Makhija find that trade credit comprised the 
largest proportion of current liabilities on firm balance sheets between 1980-1992.  Anderson & Makhija, 
supra note 15, at 314.   
78  PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20 (nearly 20% of Japanese bankruptcies during the observed 
period were directly or indirectly attributable to the bankruptcies of related companies).   
79  Id. at 21.   
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failure, with management fleeing the scene as creditors break into a factory 
and pile capital equipment and inventory into trucks.80  
While creditor raids were not the norm, they reflect the anxiety among 
trade creditors about the prospects of repayment under circumstances in 
which negotiated resolution appeared difficult to achieve.81  For their part, 
banks rarely participated in private liquidations, instead setting-off 
outstanding credits against the distressed firm’s deposits and relying on the 
procedure of civil execution to satisfy additional outstanding credits against 
the collateralized assets of the firm.82  Banks were vulnerable to the seizure 
of collateralized equipment and inventory by unsecured trade creditors, but 
foreseeing the risk of asset-stripping, banks preferred to collateralize loans 
against real property, which did not bear the risk of loss from trade creditor 
raids.83  
In fact, private liquidations shared many similarities with the private 
reorganization procedure utilized in the Toyo Kogyo case study. In private 
reorganizations, the main bank of the distressed firm would call a creditors’ 
meeting and serve as the de facto chairman, describing the condition of the 
distressed firm and proposing a plan for financial restructuring of the firm’s 
debts. 84   The appointment of main bank executives to the board of the 
distressed firm, as in Toyo Kogyo, served to monitor and discipline 
management and incentivize their compliance with the interests of 
creditors.85  
Similarly, in private liquidations, it was typical for a leading trade 
creditor or the distressed debtor to call a creditors’ meeting, at which an 
explanation would be given for the business failure of the firm and the 
current conditions of the distressed firm and its assets and liabilities would 
be presented.86  At this meeting, creditors would select a creditors committee 
and appoint a chairman.87  The chairman would solicit and receive letters of 
entrustment from the creditors of the firm, and would seek to obtain the 
cooperation of the debtor in subsequent creditor meetings.88  The chairman 
would oversee the liquidation of three classes of assets:  the account 
receivables of the distressed debtor; movables, including machines and 
                                                      
80  Id.    
81  Id.   
82  Id. at 22.   
83  Id. at 24.   
84  Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 102.   
85  See Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 228-30; see also Aoki, Patrick, & Sheard, supra note 5, at 
16-20 (discussing bank monitoring of distressed firms).   
86  Aoki, Patrick, & Sheard, supra note 5, at 23.   
87  Id.   
88  Id.   
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inventory; and real property (although real property was usually secured 
against bank loans).89  
The chairman in a trade creditor-led private liquidation played a role 
similar to that of the trustee in a formal bankruptcy proceeding, evaluating 
creditors’ claims and overseeing the distribution of proceeds from 
liquidation of the firm’s assets.90  The chairman’s role, however, was weaker 
than that of a trustee in bankruptcy court in regard to preventing holdout 
creditors from disrupting the liquidation process, since the chairman could 
neither impose a mandatory stay upon creditors nor rely on voting 
mechanisms to force a “clamp-down” on recalcitrant creditors. 91  
Additionally, the chairman was dependent upon the good-faith actions of the 
distressed debtor in private liquidation; a non-cooperative debtor could hide 
or fraudulently convey the assets of the firm, creating obstacles to resolution 
that would slow down the liquidation process.92  
Despite the difficulties attendant in private liquidation, there were 
efficiency advantages in both the size of distribution and the length of 
procedure relative to formal liquidation proceedings in court.  Packer and 
Ryser find that distribution rates in Nagoya and Tokyo were somewhat 
higher in private liquidation than in bankruptcy cases.93  The time savings 
were more pronounced:  private liquidations in Nagoya and Tokyo were on 
average five months to one year, while bankruptcy proceedings usually 
lasted significantly longer, with 50.3% of all such proceedings concluded in 
1989 lasting for more than three years, and 24% lasting for more than five 
years.94   
Packer and Ryser’s study suggests, however, that some types of 
business failures were statistically more likely to go to formal legal 
proceedings than others.  For instance, debtors in court-based liquidation 
cases had nearly 20% larger amounts of outstanding liabilities than debtors 
in private liquidations, which suggests either that the transaction costs of 
private negotiation increased as the number of creditors of the firm 
increased, or that formal proceedings were still necessary to resolve the 
thorniest cases.95  Packer and Ryser’s account suggests that, consistent with 
                                                      
89  Id. at 24.   
90  PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 24.   
91  Id. at 25.   
92  Id.   
93  Id. at 25-26.   
94  Id. at 26.   
95  PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 29.   
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Judge Easterbrook’s observation, recourse to formal legal processes occurred 
more frequently as the costs of negotiated resolution increased.96 
D. Implications  
The aforementioned studies of private reorganizations and liquidations 
suggest that private resolution of business failure was more likely to succeed 
where creditor composition was relatively small and homogenous.  In 
contrast, where creditors were more numerous and diverse, negotiating costs 
were higher and the ability of creditors to avoid formal legal proceedings 
was diminished.  
 Miwa and Ramseyer demonstrate that while creditor composition may 
have influenced the preference for market methods over recourse to formal 
legal process, bank-led private reorganizations were far from ubiquitous and 
often unsuccessful.97  Many firms that sought bank assistance did not receive 
it, and many firms that did receive initial bank support were unable to turn 
around their performance and eventually failed or were merged into another 
firm. 98   The proportion of debt finance in the firm’s capital structure 
increased the risk of default, but creditor concentration and main bank 
affiliation did not fully hedge against that risk.   
In their empirical study, Miwa and Ramseyer found that Japanese 
banks made loans to financially distressed firms, but that banks increased 
their loan levels to financially distressed firms at a slower rate than to 
solvent firms, and that main bank lending to insolvent firms did not 
necessarily keep such firms from failing.99  Indeed, their research indicates 
that main banks reduced their exposure to financially distressed borrowers, 
and that the closer the ties a firm had to a main bank, the greater the cuts in 
that bank’s exposure to the borrower following the onset of financial 
distress.100  Moreover, Miwa and Ramseyer find that distressed borrowers 
switched main bank affiliation as frequently as did solvent firms, suggesting 
that firms did not expect their existing main bank to initiate rescue 
operations in accordance with an implicit rescue guarantee.101  While further 
empirical research is needed, it appears that while bank debt capital 
structures and small, homogenous creditor compositions were not 
determinative of the approach taken by creditors, these factors nonetheless 
                                                      
96  Id. at 31.   
97  Miwa & Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies, supra note 11, at 309-15.   
98  Id.   
99  Id. at 321.   
100  Id. at 331.   
101  Id. at 336.   
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may have influenced the decision to rely on market methods rather than 
legal process.  As discussed in Part V, the deregulation of Japan’s capital 
markets in the 1980s enabled firms to raise capital more widely, with 
significant effects on capital structure and creditor composition.   
V. CAPITAL MARKET DEREGULATION, CHANGING CAPITAL STRUCTURES, 
AND THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: COLLUSION BETWEEN LAW AND MARKETS 
IN THE 1980S 
Over the course of the 1980s, large Japanese firms diversified their 
capital structures as ongoing deregulation of capital markets enabled them to 
raise increasingly large proportions of their capital in domestic and foreign-
currency denominated debt and equity markets.102  A concomitant decline in 
the importance of bank finance was observed.  A pair of statistics suggests 
the speed and scale of the transition in capital structure.  Between 1971 and 
1975, bank borrowing comprised 84% of all external finance of the large 
Japanese firm.  From 1981 to 1985, however, bank finance only comprised 
57% of total external financing of large Japanese firms.103  In their study of 
Japanese corporate balance sheets, Anderson and Makhija find that between 
1980 and 1992 trade credit and long-term lending declined substantially as a 
proportion of debt, while the proportion of corporate bond-backed financing 
nearly quadrupled from 3.3% to 12.5%, and equity finance as a proportion of 
assets rose from 19% to 32%.104 
This Part discusses the deregulation of Japan’s capital markets 
throughout the 1980s and considers the consequences of deregulation for 
Japanese banks.  This Part concludes by identifying the implications of 
deregulation for the private resolution of business failure through the use of 
market methods. 
A. Deregulation of Capital Markets 
It is important to note that capital market deregulation arose from 
much more modest efforts in the late 1970s to ease interest rate restrictions 
on Japanese sovereign bonds, as the Government of Japan began to run 
budget deficits.105  Previously, no secondary market for Japanese sovereign 
bonds existed.  Rather, the Ministry of Finance pressured banks to hold low-
yielding government bonds, while high growth enabled the Bank of Japan to 
                                                      
102  Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313.   
103  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 110. 
104  Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313-14.   
105  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT, supra note 23, at 13.   
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monetize these bonds without risking inflation.106  By 1977, Japanese banks 
challenged this policy and demanded the relaxation of interest rate 
restrictions on government bonds.107  The government agreed and held its 
first public auctions on government bonds in 1978.108  
The liberalization of sovereign debt jeopardized the market for 
corporate bonds, which were subject to even greater interest rate restrictions 
than sovereign bonds, and had persistently delivered below-market returns to 
corporate bondholders.109  As other scholars have noted, “it became apparent 
that the demand for corporate bonds would have been destroyed by the 
liberalization of the government bond market.”110  
Japanese regulators responded by easing regulatory restrictions on 
corporate bond issuance.  While continuing to require that corporate bonds 
be fully secured against the assets of the issuer, the government replaced 
fixed interest rate ceilings with flexible ceilings adjusted in line with market 
conditions and removed interest-rate ceilings altogether on convertible 
bonds, and the market for convertibles grew quickly.111  The next major 
reform came in 1980 with the amendment of the Foreign Exchange Law, 
which removed traditional impediments to the issuance of foreign-currency 
denominated corporate bonds in international capital markets, including 
approval by the Bond Committee.112  Under the amended Foreign Exchange 
Law, firms were no longer required to seek permission to issue foreign-
currency denominated bonds in overseas capital markets; firms needed only 
to provide notice to the Ministry of Finance that they intended to issue such 
bonds. 113   More importantly, these bonds had no security requirement, 
providing Japanese firms with their first taste of unsecured debt markets and 
lowering the entry costs of bond issuance.  Japanese firms quickly adapted to 
this liberalized debt market environment and raised nearly half of their 
capital in overseas bond markets by 1983.114  
The government followed these deregulatory measures with the 
legalization of warrant bonds in 1981, and the warrant option was made 
                                                      
106  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.   
107  Id.   
108  Id.   
109  Id.   
110 Id.  
111  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT, supra note 23, at 13.  See also Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, The 
Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will It End?, 14 NBER MACROECON. ANN. 
129, 140 (1999) (providing a detailed list of bond-market deregulatory events). 
112  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.   
113  Id.   
114 In fact, a handful of Japanese firms raised capital via Euromarket bond offerings in the early 1970s, 
but because of the permission requirements imposed prior to 1980 under the Foreign Exchange Law, few 
were able to tap the Euromarket for bond issues prior to deregulation.  See Grouse, supra note 24, at 592.    
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detachable from the underlying debt instrument in 1985.115  Warrant bonds, 
like convertible bonds, proved popular and the Ministry of Finance 
estimated in 1986 that warrant bond issues accounted for over 20% of all 
new capital raised.116  
Finally, in 1983, the government announced the first move in the most 
significant deregulation yet:  the relaxation of standards for the issuance of 
unsecured corporate bonds. 117   Prior to 1983, only two Japanese firms, 
Toyota Automotive and Matsushita Electric, were deemed sufficiently 
credit-worthy to issue completely unsecured bonds.118  In January 1983, an 
additional nine firms were permitted to issue unsecured straight bonds and 
twenty-three firms were permitted to issue unsecured convertible bonds.119  
This privilege was steadily expanded to greater numbers of firms throughout 
the 1980s.  By 1987, 180 firms were permitted to issue unsecured straight 
bonds and 330 firms were authorized to issue unsecured convertible 
bonds.120  While previous liberalizations of convertible and warrant bonds 
had increased the domestic market for Japanese corporate debt, outstanding 
security requirements on the issuance of this debt had restricted the issuance 
of this debt to the size of the firm’s unsecured assets.    
Despite this progressive deregulation of the domestic straight bond 
market, the biggest growth throughout the 1980s remained in unsecured 
convertible and warrant bonds, accounting for 77.9% of all corporate bond 
issuances in 1989.121  First, it is important to note that while many large 
firms were capable of issuing unsecured straight bonds by the late 1980s, 
this was not true throughout much of the decade.  Second, there was 
considerable resistance to the liberalization of the unsecured straight bond 
market from the Japanese commercial banks that served as corporate bond 
trustees under the Secured Corporate Bond Trustee Law.122  Under that law, 
Japanese banks were appointed as trustees over the collateral against which 
the bond was secured, and were able to charge substantial fees for their 
maintenance services.123  It was customary in the Japanese corporate debt 
market for trustee banks to bear the risk of loss in place of other 
bondholders, buying back bonds in default and then recovering their losses 
against the secured corporate debt through private negotiations or formal 
                                                      
115  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.   
116  Id.   
117 Grouse, supra note 24, at 593. 
118  Id.    
119  Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.   
120  Id.   
121  Id. at 588.   
122  Id. at 593.   
123  Id.   
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insolvency proceedings.124  In this way, informal securities market practices 
concentrated claims in the hands of a small number of bank creditors, 
reducing the cost of private negotiations.  These arrangements also enabled 
banks to influence the terms and conditions of bond issuance, since they 
were understood by the domestic market to be the ultimate risk-bearers of 
risk on default.125   
Unsecured straight bonds enabled firms to raise capital without being 
subject to collateralization and fee requirements.  Banks understood, 
however, that unsecured bond issuance coupled with traditional trusteeship 
practices threatened to expose them to buyback risk without the provision of 
either the maintenance fee cushion or the right to foreclose against collateral 
as secured claimholders in case of the default of the issuer upon its 
outstanding bonds.  Accordingly, banks used their dual powers as trustees 
and large lenders to restrict the issuance of unsecured domestic straight 
bonds.126  In 1989, at the peak of the “bubble economy,” Japanese firms 
issued only $250 million in domestic unsecured straight bonds, which 
amounted to only one-twentieth of the amount of foreign-currency 
denominated unsecured straight bonds issued by Japanese firms in overseas 
capital markets.127  
B. Consequences of Deregulation for Banks 
As the account above suggests, the deregulation of Japan’s capital 
markets in the 1980s resulted in changes to the capital structure and creditor 
composition of large Japanese firms.  Japanese firms capable of issuing 
bonds diversified their sources of debt capital and issued bonds in domestic 
and overseas capital markets.128  Deregulation of corporate bond markets 
opened the door for large-scale bond issuances, and foreign investors in 
particular demonstrated a strong appetite for Japanese bonds.  Moreover, the 
issuance of large numbers of convertible and warrant bonds in domestic and 
overseas debt markets may have eased a great deal of equity into the hands 
of domestic and foreign investors; while many more convertible bonds than 
straight bonds were issued during the 1980s, the slow growth of convertible 
                                                      
124  Id. at 594. 
125  Id.   
126  Id.   
127  Id. at 589.   
128  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT, supra note 23, at 14 (the trend by firms away from intermediated 
finance accelerated in 1983, before leveling off in 1990 at a ratio of approximately 50%).   
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bonds as a proportion of liabilities suggests that conversion rights were often 
exercised.129  
The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets also had consequences for 
Japanese banks.  While banks continued to lend to large Japanese firms, the 
growth of non-bank bondholders diversified the creditor composition of 
large firms.130  Banks were accustomed to facilitating negotiations when 
firms entered financial distress, but negotiated resolution became more 
complex as the number and diversity of creditors increased.  Additionally, 
banks’ equity stakes in their borrowers may have been diluted by the release 
of equity into the market through the exercise of convertible and warrant 
bonds.131  
As bond trustees, banks stabilized the corporate bond market in case 
of issuer default through bond buybacks, but such buybacks posed 
significant risks without pre-default collection of maintenance fees and post-
purchase security rights against the issuers.  Japanese bond investors were 
unused to pricing default risk into corporate bond purchases, since issuers 
and trustee banks shared the costs of default, and investors received low 
interest rates in return for their low risk exposure.132  Bond buybacks by 
Japanese banks did not just stabilize bond markets but also protected the 
credibility and reputation of Japanese financial intermediaries, to the extent 
that even if trustee banks were denied maintenance fees and secured claims 
against assets of the issuer, it was difficult for banks to refuse bond 
buybacks.133 
 
 
                                                      
129  Anderson & Makhija, supra note 23, at 314. 
130  See SCHAEDE, supra note 24, at 104 (figure 5.6(a) depicts flow data for corporate financing 
between 1960-2004 for large firms, illustrating that bank lending continued throughout the mid- to late-
1980s at its high-growth era levels, although it was eclipsed by stock and bond-market financing).  As some 
large borrowers stopped borrowing from banks during the 1980s, banks sought out new borrowers among 
SMEs, continuing to secure loans against collateral–largely real estate.  Id. at 102-03.   Banks throughout 
the 1980s sought to maintain high volumes of loans and overlooked borrower default risks in order to 
preserve their business model.  Id. at 103. 
131  See Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 314.  Long-term loans as a proportion of liabilities on 
firm balance sheets fell from 14.7% to 7.0% between 1980 and 1992, but bank loan volumes were 
consistent with their 1970s levels.  Id.   
132  Grouse, supra note 24, at 598 (arguing that “[i]n light of this sudden liberalization of the Japanese 
bond market, and the resulting boom in debt financing . . . it is little wonder that the general appreciation of 
risk on the part of the average Japanese investor is poorly developed”).   
133  Id.  (individual bond investors did not bear heavy losses on Japanese bond defaults prior to the 
2001 collapse of Mycal, the Japanese retailer).   
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C. Implications of Deregulation for the Private Resolution of Business 
Failure 
The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets enabled large Japanese 
firms to raise increasing proportions of their debt capital in domestic and 
foreign bond markets, resulting in the diversification of their capital 
structures and the composition of their creditors.134   As new sources of 
capital emerged, bank debt and trade credit became somewhat less 
significant sources of external capital, although banks continued to lend 
heavily throughout the 1980s.135  Diversification of creditor composition 
may have also had consequences for negotiating dynamics during the private 
resolution of business failure, as banks were joined by classes of 
bondholders with potentially divergent interests.  These developments 
occurred during a period of financial exuberance, and the implications of 
diversified capital structures and creditor compositions may not have been 
readily apparent to banks and borrowers during the 1980s.    
In Part IV, this article discusses the challenges that arose during 
Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s, during which time banks provided 
ongoing loan support to distressed borrowers to prevent their insolvency.  
Part VI seeks to explain this behavior in light of the barriers to negotiated 
resolution of business failure that arose from the diversification of creditor 
composition, as well as the existing substantive and procedural defects in 
Japan’s insolvency laws. 
VI. THE FAILURE OF MARKET METHODS AND LEGAL PROCESS IN THE 
RECESSIONARY 1990S 
As the 1990s began, Japan entered a prolonged, deep recession, 
triggering sharp declines in asset values, including equities and commercial 
real estate investment, while liabilities maintained their bubble-era values.136  
This had significant implications for Japanese firms and their creditors.   
As explained below, changes in capital structure and creditor 
composition raised barriers to negotiated resolution of business failure, and 
legal process remained burdensome and costly.  Thus, neither market 
methods nor legal process provided adequate remedies for creditors seeking 
                                                      
134  Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 314.   
135  Banks may have suffered from an adverse selection problem during this period, however, in that 
demand for loans may have been highest among borrowers that were less capable of raising capital in the 
capital markets.  SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 103.   
136  RICHARD KOO, THE HOLY GRAIL OF MACROECONOMICS: LESSONS FROM JAPAN’S GREAT 
RECESSION 13-16 (2008).  
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to resolve the near-insolvency of many distressed borrowers.  In response, 
Japanese banks provided ongoing loan support to distressed borrowers in 
order to stave off their insolvency.  This Part argues that, despite the seeming 
irrationality of continuous bank lending to non-performing borrowers, the 
simultaneous failure of market methods and legal process suggests a rational 
explanation for this behavior of Japanese banks.   
A. Japanese Banks Provided Loan Support to Distressed Borrowers 
Japanese banks were particularly vulnerable to the declining values of 
their borrowers’ assets.  While bank debt was relatively less important in the 
capital structure of Japanese firms, Japanese banks had continued to increase 
their loan exposure to Japanese firms throughout the 1980s.  Loans were 
either explicitly secured against firm assets or were at least made in the 
knowledge of the financial health of the borrower.137  As firms struggled to 
satisfy their outstanding debt obligations to Japanese banks, the volume of 
nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) in banks’ lending portfolios increased.138  
The proliferation of NPLs raised questions as to the adequacy of bank 
capital reserve ratios to meet the default risks of their borrowers.139  
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that Japanese banks continued 
lending to non-performing borrowers, supplying credit throughout the 1990s 
to firms that would otherwise have defaulted on their debt obligations and 
forced private or legal resolution of their business failure.140  Japanese banks 
pursued seemingly irrational lending strategies:  increasing the volume of 
lending to their most troubled borrowers without increasing the volume of 
lending to financially healthy borrowers, and declining to charge risk 
premiums on loans to their most troubled borrowers.141   
These lending practices had two effects.  First, they appeared to 
decrease NPLs by enabling Japanese firms to satisfy short-term debt 
obligations.  Second, they allowed Japanese firms to misrepresent their 
capital levels in order to give the appearance of financial health.142  Banks 
themselves did not have endless capital to commit to lending to 
nonperforming borrowers, and banks were only capable of engaging in this 
                                                      
137  Id. at 40 (ex. 2-1 illustrates rising bank lending to the corporate sector throughout the 1980s as a 
percentage of nominal GDP, peaking at 85% during the late 1980s).   
138  SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 36.   
139  Dan W. Puchniak, Perverse Main Bank Rescue in the Lost Decade: Proof That Unique 
Institutional Incentives Drive Japanese Corporate Governance, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 13, 44 (2007).   
140  Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of 
Credit in Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1144, 1165 (2005). 
141  Puchniak, supra note 139, at 36.   
142  Id. at 44.   
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lending scheme because of low borrowing costs from the Bank of Japan.143  
Banks could continue “evergreening” their loans so long as the repayment of 
their outstanding credit obligations was more valuable than the costs 
incurred by central bank borrowing. 144   I describe these bank lending 
practices as “loan support,” to avoid the negative connotations of 
“evergreening.”  
These lending choices, which scholars have described derisively as 
“unnatural selection” or “perverse incentives,” arguably prolonged the depth 
and severity of Japan’s recession by preventing otherwise insolvent firms 
from defaulting and by delaying structural adjustment.145  Instead, lending 
volumes remained large and expanded to nonperforming sectors of the 
Japanese economy, which could not be revived to financial health even by 
extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus.146  Puchniak argues that banks 
throughout this period were motivated in large part by the need to meet 
minimal capital requirements under Basel I rather than the desire to enhance 
profitability.147  The government of Japan helped banks to nominally meet 
their Basel-mandated risk-based capital ratios by allowing firms to employ 
accounting gimmicks to disguise the true health of their borrowers, 
prohibiting banks from disclosing their loan support for distressed 
                                                      
143  Jun Nagayasu, The Term Structure of Interest Rates and Monetary Policy During a Zero Interest 
Rate Period, 22 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 19, 22 (2004).  The official discount rate declined from 6.0% 
to 0.5% between July 1991 and September 1995.  Id.  Rates stayed low, between 0.5% and 0.25%, from 
1995 to 1998.  Id.  The Bank of Japan brought short-term interest rates near zero in February 1999 and kept 
rates at such levels until June 2006.  See Masaru Yoshitomi, Comments on: “Japanese Monetary Policy: 
1998-2005 and Beyond” by Takatoshi Ito (BIS Papers No. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap31k.pdf.   
144  Puchniak suggests that loan support was likely unprofitable for banks, despite very low borrowing 
costs, and that banks were incentivized to take losses by implicit government rescue promises and 
regulatory forbearance, and by subsidizing banks through the purchase of subordinate debt at below-market 
levels.  Puchniak, supra note 139, at 53-56.  The implicit rescue hypothesis appears questionable in light of 
the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the mergers between many other banks during the period.  Id. 
at 54.  As a counter-argument, I propose that loan support practices suggested that banks were less 
concerned by profitability than with lowering default risk.  Peek and Rosengren discuss the “balance sheet 
cosmetics” hypothesis, which suggests that “the incentive for a bank to make additional credit available to 
troubled firms to which the bank already has loans outstanding increases as the bank’s reported risk-based 
capital ratio nears its required capital ratio.” Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1150.   
145  Both negative appellations were taken from the title of Peek and Rosengren’s 2005 article.   
146  Puchniak, supra note 139, at 35-36 (finding that industries most heavily affected by the bursting of 
the bubble economy, such as real estate and construction, were among the largest loan recipients 
throughout the 1990s and increases in loan amounts to troubled borrowers in these industries should be 
viewed within a broader portrait of declining lending throughout the 1990s, as corporate borrowing 
declined throughout the 1990s).  Koo attributes declines in lending to corporate borrower’s lack of demand 
for funds, rather than to banks’ unwillingness to lend.  KOO, supra note 136, at 46-47.   
147  Puchniak, supra note 139, at 45, 47-48 (“Japanese banks found themselves in the unique position 
where government regulations and incentives, coupled with their battered balance sheets, made 
evergreening, rather than cutting risk loans, a more effective strategy” for meeting their risk-based capital 
ratios). 
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borrowers, providing reassurance that ongoing loan support would not result 
in bankruptcy, and lending capital to financial institutions at below-market 
interest rates.148  
Peek and Rosengren find that the main bank system, which declined 
in significance during the 1980s, re-emerged in the 1990s as a significant 
source of loan support to distressed firms.149  Main banks were more likely 
than secondary lenders to provide additional loans to troubled borrowers, 
and this tendency increased if the primary lender and the troubled firm were 
members of the same business group.150  Moreover, the authors’ empirical 
findings suggest that government policy identified main banks rather than 
other lenders as the appropriate providers of loan support to distressed 
borrowers. 151   Finally, Peek and Rosengren’s studies suggest that 
government lenders provided direct support to distressed firms with troubled 
main banks.152  Thus, government lending policy addressed the problem of 
financial distress from the perspectives of both lender and borrower, since 
the failure of either the borrower or the lender was likely to trigger a string 
of defaults among related parties.153  
These studies indicate significant levels of institutional intervention in 
the performance of financially distressed Japanese firms in the 1990s by 
both major commercial lenders and the Bank of Japan.  This institutional 
intervention, while preventing or prolonging the occurrence of actual default 
by distressed borrowers, has been heavily criticized for creating “zombie 
banks” and “zombie firms” which survived throughout the 1990s only by 
virtue of nontransparent accounting standards and the flow of lending 
enabled by near-zero interest rates and loose monetary and fiscal policies.154  
                                                      
148  Id. at 49-50.   
149  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1148 (finding that “the shift to bond finance and away from 
bank finance by Japanese firms did not continue during the 1990s even as the bad loan problems at banks 
intensified”). 
150  Id. at 1161.   
151 See Puchniak, supra note 139, at 58 (citing Peek & Rosengren and interpreting their analysis to 
“find that government lenders were more likely to increase loans to firms that had troubled main banks . . . 
[suggesting] that the government attempted to aid unhealthy main banks that were keeping their promise to 
evergreen.”). 
152  Id. at 1162. 
153  See Packer & Ryser’s findings on the significant number of insolvencies triggered by the 
insolvency of related firms.  PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20.   
154  See Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, & Anil K.  Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed 
Restructuring in Japan, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1943 (2008) (for the argument that loan support to “zombie 
firms” delayed restructuring by preventing competitive forces from forcing troubled firms to fire workers 
and lose market share).   
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B. Loan Support Can Be Explained By the Failure of Market Methods 
and Legal Processes. 
It seems plausible that the Bank of Japan and Japanese commercial 
banks coordinated their policy to provide liquidity to distressed firms and 
avoid or postpone the incidence of widespread insolvency.  These goals 
seem consistent with earlier bank behavior, particularly in light of the 
liquidity and cash-flow enhancing effects of bank supervision of distressed 
firms.155  It is possible to explain loan support, however, without finding that 
Japanese banks operated as implicit rescuers.  As Miwa and Ramseyer have 
observed, the implicit rescue hypothesis is largely myth and ignores the 
influence of rational incentives on the behavior of banks and borrowers.156 
In fact, bank behavior was rational under the circumstances.  These 
circumstances included near-zero interest rates and loose monetary policy, 
the failure of market methods to resolve business failure where changes in 
capital structure had raised the costs of private negotiations, and substantive 
and procedural deficiencies in Japan’s insolvency laws that limited their 
utility. 
1. Low Interest Rates and Loose Monetary Policies Enabled Loan 
Support 
The Bank of Japan’s monetary policies throughout the 1990s kept 
interest rates close to zero, enabling commercial banks to borrow from the 
central bank at very low cost.  The banks providing loan support were 
usually major lenders, if not primary lenders, of the distressed firms.  It is 
likely that these banks had major loan exposure to the distressed firms 
receiving loan support, including debt obligations nearing maturity. 157  
Default upon such short-term debt obligations would require banks to take 
major writedowns on their balance sheets, calling into question the adequacy 
of their capital reserves and threatening to throw banks into insolvency.158  
                                                      
155  Morck & Nakamura, supra note 10, at 336.   
156  See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter?  The Myth of the 
Japanese Main Bank, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 298 (2005) [hereinafter Does Relationship 
Banking Matter?]. 
157  Indeed, Peek and Rosengren suggest that the rationale for providing loan support was precisely to 
prevent firms from defaulting on short-term debts owed to the financial institution providing the loan 
support.  This was done to prevent borrower default, which in turn shielded the bank’s reported risk-based 
capital ratio from declining.  Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1165.   
158  Id.  This phenomenon occurred in 1997, when the failure of Sanyo Securities triggered the 
collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and ultimately the failure of Yamaichi Securities.  See Mitsuhiro 
Fukao, Recapitalizing Japan’s Banks: The Functions and Problems of Financial Revitalization Act and 
Bank Recapitalization Act, 38 KEIO BUS. REV. 1 (2000).   
JUNE 2013    CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION, & INSOLVENCY 541 
 
The provision of loan support to distressed borrowers was rational for 
banks with significant loan exposure to non-performing borrowers, so long 
as the costs of capital from the Bank of Japan were less than the expected 
value of debt repayment by the troubled borrower.  This mechanism allowed 
commercial banks to borrow cheaply, lend this money out to debtors at a 
higher rate, and receive some of that loan capital back in return as repayment 
of interest and principal on debt obligations nearing maturity.  A portion of 
this money would go to paying interest rates on the sum borrowed from the 
central bank, and a portion might go towards bank expenses or reinvestment.  
Loan support provided banks with interest income they would not otherwise 
have, and allowed banks to avoid writedowns that might reveal the extent of 
their bad debt exposure. 
Loan support to distressed firms may have allocated capital 
inefficiently to firms that could not make good use of the capital, but this is 
precisely the sort of moral hazard invited by ultra-low interest rates and 
loose monetary policies.159  Although loan support was highly susceptible to 
abuse, the policy was not without its theoretical merits.  If banks reinvested 
their earnings from loan repayments in higher-return assets that allowed 
them to cover residual losses from the NPLs in their loan portfolios, such 
policies over time might eventually permit banks to sever their ties with 
troubled borrowers once their balance sheets were sufficiently recovered to 
bear the losses.160 
2. Loan Support Was Not Provided to All Distressed Borrowers 
The existence of loan support did not prevent many financially 
distressed firms from entering insolvency in the 1990s.  Until the 1990s, the 
annual rate of all insolvency filings, including corporate and personal 
liquidations and reorganizations, was only 2,254 per year.161  There was a 
surge in corporate and personal insolvency filings in the early 1990s, which 
led courts to adapt their procedures to accommodate the increased volume of 
insolvency filings.162  These internal reforms prompted a second wave of 
                                                      
159  See Adam S. Posen, The Political Economy of Deflationary Monetary Policy, in JAPAN’S 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE 194, 206 (Ryoichi Mikitani & Adam S. Posen 
eds., 2000), available at: http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/319/9iie289X.pdf (Bank of 
Japan Governor Hayami Masaru spoke frequently of the moral hazards posed by Japan’s zero interest rate 
policy).   
160  This view is consistent with Miwa and Ramseyer’s argument that Japanese bankers reduced loan 
exposure to troubled borrowers where they could, and provided continued loan support only when banks 
decide that continued support will enhance the prospects of repayment.  See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 
11, at 338.   
161  Anderson, supra note 2, at 3.   
162  Id. at 4.   
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corporate and personal filings in the mid-1990s.163  Part IV suggests that 
Japanese creditors historically relied on market methods to resolve business 
failure because the costs of private negotiation were lower than the costs of 
legal proceedings, and that the high costs associated with formal insolvency 
proceedings in Japan gave incentives to creditors and distressed firms alike 
to resolve failure through private negotiations.   
Accordingly, while further empirical work must be done in this area, it 
seems reasonable to predict that many more firms were privately 
reorganized or liquidated throughout the 1990s than were reorganized or 
liquidated through court procedures.  A sharp increase in bankruptcy filings 
likely represented only a small fraction of total business failures during the 
decade.  These findings suggest that Japanese banks did not provide lending 
support indiscriminately but continued to distinguish firms that possessed 
sound prospects for recovery but needed time to reduce debt from firms that 
required either reorganization or liquidation.  Alternatively, banks might 
have targeted lending support to firms to which they had large loan 
exposures and allowed firms that posed less risk to banks’ balance-sheet 
health to fail.  Either explanation is consistent with the claim that the 
application of loan support was guided by rational incentives.   
 
3. Loan Support Did Not Prevent Japanese Firms from Raising Debt 
Capital in the Domestic Bond Market 
Despite allegations of perverse incentives, loan support likely did not 
prevent healthier firms from raising debt capital.  Rather, the domestic bond 
market remained relatively robust throughout the 1990s, following 
commercial law reforms that relaxed debt issuance restrictions and removed 
the trustee bank barriers to the issuance of domestic straight unsecured 
bonds.164   
Under the pre-1993 Commercial Code, Japanese firms were restricted 
from issuing public debt beyond either a firm’s capital, cash reserves, or net 
assets according to its final balance sheet. 165   As Japanese firms faced 
declining asset values, restrictive debt issuance laws threatened to shut many 
leveraged firms out of domestic capital markets, forcing Japanese firms to 
rely more heavily on overseas capital markets.166  The 1993 Commercial 
Code Reform abolished bond issuance restrictions and reformed the 
                                                      
163  Id.   
164  Grouse, supra note 24, at 589.   
165  Id. at 594.   
166  Id. at 595. 
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corporate bond trustee system, lowering barriers to the issuance of domestic 
corporate bonds.167  Trustees were replaced by Corporate Bond Management 
Companies, which were more limited in the scope of their managerial 
powers, enabling securities companies to play a larger role in structuring 
bond offerings and reducing bond issuance fees and maintenance fees.168  
Following the 1993 Commercial Code Reform, new bond offerings 
were largely unsecured straight bonds without implicit buyback guarantees.  
While unsecured straight bonds had comprised only 9% of the Japanese 
bond market in 1989, they swelled to a whopping 93.2% of the market by 
1997169  The volume of domestic bonds issued also increased significantly.  
In 1997, $57 billion worth of domestic straight bonds were issued, which 
was 190 times greater than the value of such bonds issued in 1989 and six 
times greater than the value of all overseas straight bonds issued in 1997.170  
The robust domestic market for Japanese bonds suggested that many market 
participants, including institutional investors, believed that the repayment 
prospects for Japanese corporate debt were sufficiently good to buy 
unsecured bonds without conversion or warrant rights.171  
An alternative explanation for the growth in the domestic corporate 
bond market that is consistent with the unnatural selection or perverse 
incentives hypotheses is that the incentives of Japanese banks were so 
skewed by policies favoring the bailout of financially distressed firms that 
healthy borrowers could not get bank loans on attractive terms.172  This 
explanation has persuasive force, although firms’ preference for bond 
finance over bank debt was also manifest during the 1980s, prior to the 
recession and the implementation of loan support.  Additionally, while 
empirical research is needed, it seems plausible that Japanese banks 
preferred to diversify their portfolios by buying bonds issued by non-
distressed firms, since bonds provided greater liquidity than loans and could 
be sold in the market when necessary.  The increased issuance of domestic 
corporate bonds seems to point to both slackening overseas demand for 
                                                      
167  Id. at 596.   
168  Id. at 597.   
169  Id. at 588.   
170  Id. at 589 (noting that domestic unsecured straight corporate bonds accounted for 62% of the 
Japanese bond market). 
171  This latter element may have been more reflective of poor equities performance than the 
confidence of bond investors.   
172  Puchniak, supra note 139, at 37 (arguing that loan share increased throughout the 1990s to the 
worst-performing sectors of the Japanese economy and decreased to Japan’s healthy, export-driven 
manufacturing sector).  But see KOO, supra note 136, at 46-47 (arguing that this was not due to banks’ lack 
of willingness to lend, but to decreased demand by borrowers for loans and increased levels of corporate 
savings and debt repayment). 
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Japanese corporate debt and relatively less favorable terms of bank debt than 
bond finance for non-distressed firms.  However, it does not appear that loan 
support skewed capital allocation such that large, non-distressed firms were 
unable to raise debt capital.   
 
4. Creditor and Stakeholder Composition Continued to Diversify 
Throughout the 1990s, Potentially Raising Barriers to the Negotiated 
Resolution of Business Failure 
The continued diversification of creditors and shareholders of the 
Japanese firm throughout the 1990s, including the growth of foreign 
institutional investors, may have raised barriers to the negotiated resolution 
of business failure, discouraging Japanese banks from making use of market 
methods.  As discussed below, foreign institutional investors brought new 
perspectives that frequently placed them in tension with both firm 
management and Japanese banks. 
Ahmadjian and Robbins characterize the rising influence of foreign 
institutional investors in the Japanese equity market during the 1990s as a 
conflict between the stakeholder and shareholder governance.173  As Western 
institutional investors, including pension funds and mutual funds, took 
portfolio stakes in Japanese firms, they favored downsizing and asset 
divestiture to constrain bloated cost structures, often placing them in conflict 
with incumbent management.174  
Japanese business leaders had long focused on diversification and 
corporate growth, prioritizing growth over profitability and demonstrating 
relatively little interest in maximizing share price for the benefit of 
investors.175  Long-term cross-shareholdings, declined in the 1980s as the 
exercise of convertible and warrant bonds diluted the value of such 
shareholdings, and continued to diminish in the 1990s as banks sold off their 
cross-shareholdings to streamline their stock portfolios.  Japanese trading 
partners in cross-shareholdings also sold equity stakes.176  As banks and 
trading partners liquidated their positions, traditionally passive shareholders 
were replaced by foreign institutional investors seeking bargains in 
depressed Japanese stocks who demanded that firm management deliver 
higher returns on capital.177  
                                                      
173  Christina L. Ahmadjian & Gregory E. Robbins, A Clash of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders 
and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 451, 452 (2005).   
174  Id. at 453, 457.   
175  Id. at 454.   
176  Id. at 457.   
177  Id.   
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Foreign shareholders exercised influence not just by increasing their 
stakes in Japanese firms, but by actively participating in shareholder 
governance, attending annual meetings and demanding that management 
listen to their ideas.178  Moreover, foreign investors exercised their right to 
exit, trading actively and influencing share prices. 179   While foreign 
investors held only 10% of publicly traded shares, they executed 30% of 
stock trades, a figure that further increased to nearly 40% in 1999, and 
Japanese institutional investors often followed trading patterns initiated by 
foreign shareholders.180  
In addition to being confronted by foreign shareholders, firm 
managers were confronted by domestic and foreign bondholders, including 
municipal governments, institutional funds, and individual investors.  Like 
foreign shareholders, these large and diverse classes of creditors had varying 
interests and appetites for risk.  These new classes of bondholders and 
shareholders were different from the relatively concentrated and 
homogenous bank creditors whose sophistication, aligned interests, and 
similar concern for reputational costs facilitated private negotiation.   
Just as Japanese managers were unaccustomed to being confronted by 
activist shareholders seeking board representation or influence over the 
business activities of the firm, Japanese commercial banks were 
unaccustomed to the participation of large and unruly classes of creditors or 
share sell-offs by institutional investors as firms approached financial 
distress.  Bank creditors were accustomed to negotiating with each other 
over the fate of distressed debtors and may have had reputational incentives 
not to block a compromise lest they suffer a similar fate when their major 
borrower was financially distressed.  In contrast, bondholders had no 
incentive to cooperate with bank creditors and strong incentives to force 
secured bank creditors to accept losses on their claims.  Foreign institutional 
investors were more willing than Japanese shareholders to engage in cross-
shareholdings to sell their stakes in distressed firms, trading sufficient 
volumes to force Japanese institutional investors to sell off their holdings as 
well.181  
To Japanese banks concerned with facilitating private negotiations, 
increasingly expensive and difficult creditor negotiations and opportunistic 
foreign shareholders may have provided powerful incentive to prevent their 
major borrowers from entering financial distress by providing loan support.  
                                                      
178  Id. at 458.   
179  Id. at 457.   
180  Id.    
181  Id.    
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Loan support would not necessarily save distressed borrowers, but it could 
postpone default indefinitely and provide a distressed firm with breathing 
room and a chance to reverse its fortunes.  Using loan support to postpone 
private resolution of business failure resulted in financing costs for banks 
and borrowers alike, but these costs could plausibly be tolerable if creditor 
negotiations were anticipated to yield even greater costs for banks and firm 
management.   
Since creditors could push failing negotiations into insolvency 
proceedings, the costs of negotiating the resolution of business failure were 
unpredictable.  It is thus unsurprising that banks might sometimes choose to 
incur the predictable financing costs of loan support, rather than incur the 
uncertain costs of negotiation with large and diverse classes of creditors.  It 
is equally unsurprising that management of distressed firms might 
sometimes accept loan support, rather than brave unpredictable negotiations 
and the possibility of dismissal if creditors tired of negotiations and pushed 
the firm into involuntary bankruptcy.    
It appears that Japanese banks used loan support as a postponement 
tactic, the desirability of which arose from banks’ concerns that private 
negotiations would diminish their prospects of debt repayment, as 
bondholders demanded at least partial recovery of their loss.  Where banks 
could no longer reliably control negotiation outcomes, banks used loan 
support to allow distressed borrowers to stay in business and pay down their 
outstanding debts.  For banks, loan support was rational and maximized their 
repayment prospects.  The financing costs of providing loan support were 
low throughout the 1990s, while the barriers to achieving their repayment 
goals in private negotiations were higher than before. 
As discussed above, low interest rates and loose monetary policies 
enabled Japanese banks to borrow cheaply from the Bank of Japan and 
provide loan support to distressed borrowers.  The simultaneous failure of 
market methods and legal processes gave banks rational incentives to do so, 
rather than bear the uncertainty and costs of negotiated resolution or formal 
insolvency proceedings.  
In order to change banks’ incentives, however, the central bank had to 
raise borrowing costs for banks until loan support became too costly to 
prolong, or until the conditions causing either market failure or legal failure 
were resolved.  In Part VII, I argue that major reforms in Japanese 
bankruptcy laws addressed substantive and procedural defects in Japan’s 
insolvency laws and provided Japanese creditors with a streamlined and less 
costly alternative to private negotiations, enabling Japanese creditors to use 
formal legal proceedings to resolve many business failures between 2000 
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and 2003.  Legal reforms reduced the expected costs of insolvency 
proceedings relative to the costs of loan support or private negotiation such 
that creditors and debtors demonstrated a growing preference for legal 
processes over the market methods available to them.   
VII. INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY  
Despite an initial wave of insolvency filings in the early 1990s, 
Japanese courts and legal scholars recognized that the existing insolvency 
laws were costly, procedurally inefficient, and impeded the timely resolution 
of business failure. 182   As discussed in this Part, the Japanese legal 
community–including judges, academics, and practitioners–undertook 
significant reforms of Japan’s insolvency law and court procedures in order 
to remove substantive and procedural barriers to the use of formal 
insolvency proceedings.  Post-reform filing statistics suggest that these 
reforms removed significant barriers to the use of legal process to resolve 
business failure.  
A. Development and Implementation of Insolvency Law Reforms 
Japanese judges first implemented an internal reform of court 
procedures in the mid-1990s, which resulted in a second wave of insolvency 
filings as Japanese creditors sought to work through another group of deeply 
distressed borrowers.183  However, some of the most significant obstacles to 
the use of legal process, including the gatekeeping mechanisms and 
trusteeship reorganization requirements, remained in place.184   
Despite initial procedural reforms, use of insolvency proceedings 
remained somewhat tepid.  As discussed previously, loan support might 
account in part for creditors’ reluctance to rely on legal process. Banks had 
strong incentives to use loan support to slowly ease bad debt off their books, 
and many distressed firms likely postponed restructuring or liquidation given 
the availability of loan support.185  Periodic waves of insolvency filings may 
have reflected creditors’ interest in formally resolving business failure, but 
the transience of such waves suggested that creditors’ disappointment with 
legal process led them to fall back on either loan support or market methods. 
                                                      
182  Anderson, supra note 2, at 4.   
183 Id.  
184  Id. at 11-12.   
185  Id. at 4.  This was described in the Japanese press as the “bad debt problem” (furyō saiken mondai) 
and was attributed in part to the inefficiencies and costs associated with insolvency proceedings.  Id.    
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In the face of these structural barriers to the use of legal process, 
voices within the Japanese legal community advocated for insolvency law 
reform in order to reduce the costs associated with insolvency proceedings 
and give creditors incentives to use the courts.186  The government of Japan 
formed an insolvency reform subcommittee of the Judicial System 
Deliberative Council, comprised largely of legal academics and 
practitioners. 187   This subcommittee set a goal of reforming and 
consolidating Japan’s insolvency laws into three procedures:  Civil 
Rehabilitation, Corporate Reorganization, and Bankruptcy.188  
The subcommittee focused its attention first upon Civil Rehabilitation, 
which was previously known as Composition (wagi).  The Civil 
Rehabilitation Act was enacted on April 1, 2000, and retained many of the 
core components of the Composition procedure.  It was a reorganization 
procedure that applied to both personal and corporate insolvency, it left the 
debtor partially in control, and it did not extend to secured interests.189   
The Civil Rehabilitation Act made several major alterations to the pre-
existing Composition procedure.  First, the pre-application screening of the 
debtor by the court, previously a strict gatekeeping mechanism that 
threatened to push many debtor-in-possession reorganizations into 
trusteeship proceedings, was reduced to a nominal review by the court.190  
This change mitigated the debtor firm’s incentives to gamble with the assets 
of the firm or take on additional debt to prevent entering insolvency, since 
Civil Rehabilitation would not necessarily result in the immediate dismissal 
of firm management.   
The Civil Rehabilitation procedure also allowed the court upon 
application to impose a stay over secured creditors and even authorized the 
court to strip creditors of their security interests.191  The stay provisions may 
have altered the negotiation dynamics between secured and unsecured 
creditors when an insolvency filing was considered, preventing secured 
creditors from foreclosing on collateral and raiding the firm’s assets while 
unsecured creditors negotiated the terms of the reorganization.  The 
imposition of the stay gave unsecured creditors a greater voice in 
                                                      
186  Id. at 4-5.   
187  Id. at 5.   
188  Id. at 6.  See also Shinjiro Takagi, Restructuring in Japan, 12 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 1 (2003).    
189  Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.  Minji saisei ho [Civil Rehabilitation Act], Law No. 225 of 1999 
(Japan).  
190  Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.   
191  Takagi, supra note 188, at 4 (while a secured creditor can enforce its secured rights, a debtor is 
eligible a temporary stay order prohibiting enforcement of that secured right for a certain period; also, 
secured rights cannot be extinguished without the consent of the secured creditor unless the debt has been 
paid in full). 
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reorganization proceedings and more closely aligned the incentives of 
secured and unsecured creditors, encouraging them to reach a mutually 
satisfactory compromise.  This was particularly significant where bank 
creditors held security interests in the assets of the distressed firm and 
bondholders were almost entirely unsecured.192  
In addition to these substantive reforms, the Civil Rehabilitation Act 
furthered internal reforms made by courts throughout the 1990s in enhancing 
procedural efficiency, lowering time and costs associated with filing. 193  
Anderson argues that these procedural reforms had a major impact on the 
success of formal reorganization proceedings, accelerating the pace of 
reform and reducing the ability of creditor and the debtor management to 
engage in holdup tactics that might deplete firm value and result in the loss 
of valuable opportunities for reform.194  Creditor-imposed delays could not 
only raise the costs of insolvency procedures, but could also prevent 
distressed firms from raising capital, making investments, and retaining 
market position, which potentially diminished the firms’ prospects for 
recovery.195   
Most importantly, the Civil Rehabilitation Act galvanized creditors 
and debtors to file for insolvency at record-breaking levels.  While annual 
corporate insolvency filings in the 1990s numbered in the hundreds, there 
were 10,000 filings in 2002 alone, and nearly all of these filings were under 
the Civil Rehabilitation Act. 196   While the Civil Rehabilitation Act was 
intended to facilitate reorganizations for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, large firms also made use of the law.197  Despite the exclusion of 
secured creditors from court proceedings, large corporate debtors and their 
creditors valued the reduced scrutiny and quick resolution of insolvency and 
became primary users of the Civil Rehabilitation procedure.198  
                                                      
192  Id.  Takagi addresses other changes in the Civil Rehabilitation Act, including mitigation of the 
majority requirement, court permits for sale of the debtor’s business, and the reduction of capital without 
shareholders’ resolutions.  Id.  A reorganization plan may only alter the rights of unsecured creditors if it is 
accepted by a simple majority of creditors holding more than half of the total amount of unsecured claims 
outstanding.  Id.  Government and state-owned financial institutions, which usually have large numbers of 
claims, are reluctant to accept plans that alter their claims.  Id.  The consent standards for the alteration of 
secured creditors’ claims are still very high but were reduced to a bare majority level for unsecured claims.  
Id.  Under the revised Civil Rehabilitation Act, courts can permit the sale of all or part of a firm’s business 
without a shareholder’s resolution, and can reduce an insolvent firm’s capital without a shareholder’s 
resolution.  Id.  A shareholder’s resolution is still required, however, to raise capital.  Id.   
193  Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.   
194  Id.   
195  For further discussion of the indirect costs of bankruptcy, see Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: 
Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977).    
196  Anderson, supra note 2, at 16.   
197  Id. at 8. 
198  Id.   
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Following the enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, the 
subcommittee reformed the Corporate Reorganization Act and the 
Bankruptcy Act in April 2003 and January 2005, respectively. 199   The 
Corporate Reorganization Act retained all the basic features of the previous 
procedure.  It was a trustee-driven reorganization procedure including both 
secured and unsecured creditors, any plan under which required a majority 
vote of all participating creditors.200  While the Corporate Reorganization 
Act did include some procedural innovations, such as a quick approval 
process for the sale of assets and lien-stripping, few cases appear to have 
been filed under the Corporate Reorganization Act.201   
Similarly, the revised Bankruptcy Act largely preserved existing 
Japanese liquidation procedures, with some refinements to enhance 
procedural speed and enable the consolidation of parent-subsidiary 
liquidations for the benefit of creditors. 202   As with the Corporate 
Reorganization Act, filings under the Bankruptcy Act appear to have been 
few in number.203  
B. Consequences of Insolvency Law Reform 
It appears that the most significant consequence of Japan’s insolvency 
law reforms was the stark increase in the number of corporate filings under 
the Civil Rehabilitation Act.  The provisions for debtor-in-possession 
reorganization, exclusion of secured creditors, and procedural efficiencies 
appear to have overcome some of the most implacable obstacles to the 
utilization of legal process by creditors and debtors.  The possibility of 
retaining firm management during the reorganization process may have 
reduced management’s incentive to avoid insolvency at any cost, even at the 
risk of destroying firm value and diminishing recovery for creditors of the 
firm. 
The exclusion of secured creditors from the Civil Rehabilitation 
process was also significant, since this could plausibly reduce the risk of 
holdup by secured creditors and facilitate compromise among unsecured 
bondholders. 204   By dividing secured and unsecured creditors and only 
                                                      
199  Id. at 11-12.  Kaisha kōsei hō [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law No. 172 of 1952 (Japan) (as 
amended by Law No. 154 of 2002); Hasan Hō [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 71 of 1922 (Japan) (as amended 
by Law No. 75 of 2004).   
200  Anderson, supra note 2, at 12.    
201  Id. at 11-12; Takagi, supra note 188, at 6-7 (proposing that the lack of a “debtor in possession” 
system was responsible for low levels of interest in using the corporate reorganization procedure).   
202  Anderson, supra note 2, at 12.   
203  Id. at 16.   
204 Id. at 7.   
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requiring unsecured creditors to approve the reorganization plan, the Civil 
Rehabilitation procedure minimized the conflicts of interest between 
dissimilar creditor classes that could arise in negotiated resolution. 205  
Finally, the reduced costs and expedited pace of Civil Rehabilitation 
proceedings likely lowered the barriers to filing and reduced the risk that 
distressed firms would stagnate further during lengthy insolvency 
proceedings.206   
In contrast, the apparently low rates of creditor utilization of 
Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy procedures may indicate that 
these procedures did not align creditor and debtor interests as successfully, 
or that these procedures did not offer an additional value to creditors not 
already realized by Civil Rehabilitation procedures.  Timing could also be a  
significant factor:  the processing of tens of thousands of Civil Rehabilitation 
filings during the first years of the new century indicates creditors’ pent-up 
demand for cost-effective legal process, but by the 2003 enactment of the 
Corporate Reorganization Act, corporate insolvency filings were already 
easing from their peak in 2002.  While further empirical work is needed 
here, it seems possible that the unprecedented and prolonged surge of 
corporate insolvencies between 2000 and 2003 resolved a significant portion 
of the outstanding distressed corporate debt.   
Changes in accounting standards and balance sheet consolidation 
under the 1998 financial reforms may have galvanized creditors to push their 
distressed debtors into Civil Rehabilitation, since creditors could no longer 
disguise their NPL exposure.207  Distressed firms could no longer hide asset 
devaluations on their books under mark-to-market accounting standards.208  
Changes in accounting standards that increased the visibility of loan 
support, while reducing its effectiveness in masking bad debt, likely 
prompted creditors to push distressed firms into insolvency proceedings, but 
reforms in insolvency law likely mattered as well.  Moreover, while the main 
providers of loan support were major bank lenders with security interests in 
the assets of the firm, secured creditors could be excluded altogether from 
Civil Rehabilitation proceedings on application, allowing the court to 
consider the interests of unsecured creditors.209   
                                                      
205 Takagi, supra note 188, at 5.   
206 Anderson, supra note 2, at 7. 
207  SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 127 (concluding that consolidated accounting standards adopted from 
2000 onwards prevented firms and banks from hiding unprofitable businesses in privately held subsidiaries, 
and mandatory quarterly earnings reports improved the availability of Japanese corporate information).   
208  Id. (noting that mark to market valuation of corporate stockholdings also forced firms to revalue 
their equity portfolios at current market value, revealing the extent of post-Bubble losses on firm balance 
sheets).   
209 Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.   
552 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
Accounting changes were most likely to imperil the lending 
relationships between main banks and their distressed borrowers, but main 
banks were not the beneficiaries of Civil Rehabilitation.  Rather, the Civil 
Rehabilitation Act may have enabled unsecured creditors to push distressed 
firms into insolvency without risking depletion of firm value by secured 
lenders.    
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While further empirical work is necessary in order to strengthen and 
validate the tentative findings of this article, this account is intended to 
identify possible relationships between capital structure and creditor 
composition on the one hand, and the choice between market methods and 
legal process as a means of resolving business failure on the other.   
Concentrated firm capital structures and small, relatively homogenous 
groups of secured bank creditors appear to have produced conditions under 
which private negotiation of business failure was perceived as an adequate 
remedy and relatively more desirable than reliance on legal process.  The 
availability of adequate market methods likely reduced the demand for legal 
process, obviating the need to address procedural and substantive defects in 
Japan’s insolvency laws.  The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets 
enabled firms to reorganize their capital structures, increasing the number 
and diversity of creditors and likely weakening the influence of bank 
creditors.  This article suggests that changes in capital structure and creditor 
composition may have created barriers to the negotiated resolution of 
business failure, necessitating the availability of adequate and effective legal 
process.  Yet without reform, Japan’s insolvency laws remained ill-suited to 
use by creditors.     
The onset of a severe and prolonged recession in the 1990s revealed 
the challenges of resolving business failure under circumstances in which 
neither market methods nor legal process offered effective remedies for 
creditors and distressed firms.  Loan support enabled banks and firms to 
indefinitely stave off insolvency and seemingly emerged as a rational, albeit 
undesirable, strategy in the 1990s for lack of better options. 
Finally, the enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act in 2000 may 
have broken the deadlock imposed by the simultaneous failure of market 
methods and legal process.  This Act resolved substantive and procedural 
obstacles to the use of legal process, enabling unsecured creditors 
disadvantaged by loan support to protect their interests and force the 
JUNE 2013    CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION, & INSOLVENCY 553 
 
resolution of business failure.  In the years that followed, tens of thousands 
of distressed firms were restructured under the Civil Rehabilitation Act.  
If a larger theme may be wrought from the limited scope of this text it 
is that, contrary to perceptions of stagnation and reluctance to modernize 
(most recently in the context of the Olympus corporate governance 
scandal210), Japan’s business system has demonstrated dynamism in the face 
of legal change, including the deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the 
1980s and the reform of the country’s insolvency laws at the beginning of 
the new century.  The narrative of “Japan Inc.” as a bastion of 
conservatism211 is dangerous when it distracts scholars and policymakers 
from evidence that Japanese firms are responsive to incentives and adaptive 
to changes in the legal environment.  This Article suggests that targeted legal 
reform may have a significant role to play in the revitalization of Japan’s 
economy, particularly where market methods no longer offer efficient 
solutions to increasingly complex problems.  
                                                      
210  Back to the Drawing Board: After the Olympus Scandal, Japan Inc. Wants Less Scrutiny, 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21565660-after-olympus-scandal-
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